

Потрібно пройти ще десятки років, щоб VR-освіта вийшла на масовий ринок, так само, як мультимедійні класи поступово поширилися на більшу кількість шкіл та університетів і стали одним із незамінних освітніх інструментів.

Думаємо, що інтеграція віртуальної реальності та освіти в контексті креативності та сучасних тенденції цифрового розвитку – це майбутнє нашої освіти, для реалізації якої необхідно розвивати високопотужний освітній цифровий простір.

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Yurii KONDRASHKOV,
Undergraduate Scholar
4th year undergraduate student
Kyiv Institute of Intellectual Property and Law of the National
University “Odesa Law Academy”
Ukraine

RATIONALIZATION OF WAR. THE IDEOLOGY OF WAR

“Man is the measure of all things existing – that they exist, and non-existent – that they do not exist.” This statement by Protagoras, the most famous of the Sophists, is of such great importance in the history of philosophy that, perhaps, it is only because of it that Protagoras can already be considered a key figure in this process. Of course, it can be interpreted in different ways, and it is very problematic in itself, but for the purposes of the introduction to this essay, it is worthwhile to understand “man” as a polis – a political society, since a person always belongs to a community, and communities always differ from each other and organise life in their own way¹. Differences between different political societies are caused by many factors, but ideology is the most important. Protagoras believed that the difference between polities is mainly due to people’s beliefs, while modern researchers believe that the trigger mechanism is much deeper. Ideology is a central link in social theory, in the education of the people, namely in the implementation of the ideas of the state in the minds of people².

1 Volkova, N. (2019). «Мера вещей» Протагора как критерий истины. *ΣΧΟΛΗ. Философское антиковедение и классическая традиция*, 13(2) Р. 695-704. URL : <https://doi.org/10.25205/1995-4328-2019-13-2-695-704> (15.05.2023).

2 Лопуха, Т. Л., & Соломатин, Е. В. (2018). Война и идеология. *Проблемы современного педагогического образования*, (59-2). Р. 180-184. URL : <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/voyna-i-ideologiya/viewer> (23.05.2023).

The qualitative ideological activity of the state has two main directions, which can be called attacking and defensive ideological components. The attacking component is aimed at preserving the identity and homogeneity of the people, while the defensive component is designed to mobilise people for practical activities, struggle and exposure of hostile, different views. However, both mechanisms are aimed at preserving a unified statehood and protecting the heritage of the people from the penetration of foreign ideas and customs. Probably, it is on this basis that the population develops a peculiar worldview, popularly called mentality, since upbringing itself is impossible without an ideological ideal, without a goal, that is, without ideology, and, in turn, a nation state is impossible without it³.

It is worth noting that the development of complex ideologies is a relatively new phenomenon. In their works, Weber and Michel Foucault point to a radical upheaval in both forms of social organisation and individual subjectivity during the Modern period. An example used by both scholars is the rationalisation of war. However, the close attention to infantry wars in scholarly research indicates that the process of change began long before the Modern era⁴. In their works, researchers have conditionally divided armies into modern and pre-modern ones. From a historical perspective, it is difficult to determine exactly when the first modern armies appeared, given the fact that they existed for a long time simultaneously with pre-modern ones. However, antiquity can be considered a turning point in the process of formation of modern armies alongside pre-modern ones. The differences between them may be the key to unravelling the reasons for the emergence of justifications for wars in people's minds. A characteristic feature of pre-modern warriors is a monopoly on destruction. Soldiers followed famous leaders, fascinated by their charisma and courage. They were also charismatic in a specifically religious sense: their actions were inspired by ecstatic obsession, and a charismatic warrior, no matter how skilled, could appear to an observer to be completely "out of control". The loss of a commander in battle was a serious blow to the army's combat capability. Perhaps the best example of this were the Germanic barbarians, who were believed to be in "battle ecstasy" during the combat⁵. Examples of modern warriors are

3 Лопуха, Т. Л., & Соломатин, Е. В. (2018). Война и идеология. *Проблемы современного педагогического образования*, (59-2). P. 180-184. URL : <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/voyna-i-ideologiya/viewer> (23.05.2023).

4 Martin, J. L. (2005). The objective and subjective rationalization of war. *Theory and society* P. 229-275. URL : <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4501724> (01.05.2023).

5 Martin, J. L. (2005). The objective and subjective rationalization of war. *Theory and society* P. 229-275. URL : <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4501724> (01.05.2023).

Roman soldiers of the Empire or soldiers of Alexander the Great. In this system, a soldier is just a “worker” with a very limited number of tasks. He becomes part of an army mechanism that is well-established and well thought out. The heroic battles described by Homer become obsolete, and human mechanisms and bureaucratic structures replace the heroes. However, for some time, the figures of commanders still had weight, as they were motivators for the army, while heroism was replaced by discipline and strategy. Soldiers in modern armies do not have the “full rights” in battles as they did in pre-modern ones, and are strictly limited by discipline. They are separated from ownership of the means of destruction, just as the industrial proletariat was separated from ownership of the means of production⁶. In modern armies, army formation is beginning to play an important role. In pre-modern armies, it was almost irrelevant. Moreover, the nomadic tribes that Alexander the Great encountered during his famous campaign in Asia, for example, did not need it at all. Their warfare consisted of taking advantage of the landscape to attack the enemy unexpectedly, suffering less casualties, and then flee. Archers or cavalry with bows were best suited for such strategies. The usual thing for modern armies was to face the enemy directly, head-on⁷. Naturally, when a person is in danger, he or she tries to avoid it, but soldiers could not and do not do so. One of the mechanisms for their “rational use” and, to a certain extent, for protecting soldiers was formation. Not only did it guarantee that the army would be harder to outflank and strike unexpectedly, but it also limited the soldiers’ options.

In this historical period, the importance of strategy and tactics became even more acute. The task of the strategist was to ensure the success of the army in battle, which included limiting the possibility of desertion. Most often, the army was lined up in layers, for example, with infantry in the front and cavalry on the sides and rear. This was done not only to ensure that the infantrymen were confident that no one would attack from behind, but also to ensure that there was nowhere to run⁸. The layered formation literally left the infantrymen no choice but to fight to the death. Since the battle required both defence and attack, infantry formations were developed, such as the Macedonian phalanx. In the formation, the infantrymen stand side by side, which makes them not think of themselves

6 Martin, J. L. (2005). The objective and subjective rationalization of war. *Theory and society*. P. 229-275. URL : <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4501724> (01.05.2023).

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

as something separate, but associate themselves with all the participants in the formation, thinking in common interests. If one man fled, the formation became unbalanced and lost its main defensive function and mental unity, so if one man fled, everyone fled, which inevitably led to serious losses. This is doubly true when it comes to cases where infantry clashed with cavalry. In short, infantry that does not move is strong in defence (even if it is weak in attack), and if it retreats, all is lost. Horses are usually reluctant to be mounted on a solid fence of spears, but are happy to step on the back of a man after he turns and runs⁹.

Naturally, some of the same strategic tricks can be traced back to wars in our time, but the invention of firearms changed a lot of things. From the moment when the clang of swords clashing against each other changed to the sound of shots, the formations, as they were, lost their relevance, and the generals who lead into battle were replaced by tactics, strategists in the headquarters. The issue of a motivated soldier has become more acute than ever before. At this point, ideology took over the empty niche. The ideological activities of countries were increasing, creating a certain defensive outlook in people's minds, backed up by all sorts of oaths and debts¹⁰. Today, this has led to a fundamental change in warfare. In the context of the example already given, Alexander the Great fought for the glory of a great ruler, a demigod, and for the idea of the strongest superpower of his time, i.e. he fought for an ideology. A more modern example would be the defensive war of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany, in which soldiers fought for the idea of the Motherland, etc. Nowadays, wars take place in places of particularly powerful clash of ideologies. In such a coordinate system, it is not people fighting for ideas, but ideas fighting for people. This is the main reason for the acceptance and rationalisation of war in the world today. This allows people of the warring states to form an understanding of the need for war, as the defensive worldview created by ideologies dehumanises people on the other side of the fortifications. Accordingly, the opponents begin to think of each other not as their own society, but as "others" who have nothing to do with "us". The same makes the enmity of classes within states rational¹¹.

9 Martin, J. L. (2005). The objective and subjective rationalization of war. *Theory and society*. P. 229-275. URL : <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4501724> (01.05.2023).

10 Лопуха, Т. Л., & Соломатин, Е. В. (2018). Война и идеология. *Проблемы современного педагогического образования*, (59-2). P. 180-184. URL : <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/voyna-i-ideologiya/viewer> (23.05.2023).

11 Лопуха, Т. Л., & Соломатин, Е. В. (2018). Война и идеология. *Проблемы современного педагогического образования*, (59-2). P. 180-184. URL : <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/voyna-i-ideologiya/viewer> (23.05.2023).

Ideologies as a modern phenomenon have their origins in the history of nations. In Russia, the current aggressive ideology may have originated in this way. Ethnic Russians within the Russian Federation (RF) are such a dominant population group that even the large number of various nationalities living in Russia are also considered Russians, and the Russian language is the most widely spoken in the country, despite the many others. This plays into the hands of the current government, uniting the population of the geographically largest country into a homogeneous mass¹². There is also a widespread misconception in Russia that everyone wants to attack Russia. To support this, the population is given examples of the invasions of Napoleon, the Third Reich, and many different battles from the time of the Moscow Tsardom. This has created a collective trauma among Russians, although in reality, in the last few centuries alone, Russia has fought more wars of aggression than defence in its history. The current government, led by Putin, is aware of this and skilfully uses it to its imperial advantage, convincing the people through ideology that Russia needs to create a sanitary zone around itself¹³.

In his recent article, Mikhail Epstein finds similarities between Russia and its historical predecessor, the Mongol yoke. One of these features is the key characteristic of all nomadic countries: they are the least interested in the development of their own regions, preferring the capture of new lands and actual succession in the matter of unifying the continent from ocean to ocean, which is repeatedly confirmed by bold threats in all directions¹⁴.

In addition to the mechanisms described above, the influence on the psychology of society through the church is of great importance in the implementation of the “disabled” ideology in Russia. It is a well-known fact that Putin’s government keeps the Moscow Patriarchate Church under its control. Epstein calls the regime of power in which the church and parishioners praise the son of God who died for the sins of men, while blessing the worst of sins – the murder of a brother in faith, the sin of Cain – schizophrenic fascism. He points out that there is no correlation between holiness and animal cruelty in the minds of Russians, calling it the absence of the human element and

12 Mojzes, P. B. (2022). Blending of Delusions in Russia Rationalizing its War to Annex Ukraine. *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe*, 42(7), 2. URL : <https://doi.org/10.55221/2693-2148.2375> (21.05.2023).

13 Ibid.

14 Epstein, M. (2022). Schizophrenic fascism: on Russia’s war in Ukraine. *Studies in East European Thought*, 74(4). P. 475-481. URL : <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11212-022-09487-w> (13.05.2023).

the split of nature into holy and animal, which, as already mentioned, are not connected in any way, which is social schizophrenia¹⁵.

The tools used by the modern Russian authorities to implement aggressive ideology include, for example, propaganda media and cinema. Given the above prerequisites, they are widely used in the Russian Federation to put pressure on the collective trauma of Russians, thus maintaining an aggressive ideology that can justify not only the horrors of war, but also all of Putin's imperialism and expansionism in general¹⁶. Although Putin once became famous for his rapid rise to power and ambition, in the end his achievements are limited only by the bloodshed and the vague form of fascism he has built in his state. Even though fascism is inherently a homogeneous form of power, Putin has managed to make it split – to turn it into schizofascism, which is bound to bring destruction and chaos to the Russian Federation of the future. After all, no matter what kind of schizophrenia it is, the patient eventually loses his or her identity.

In conclusion, it is necessary to emphasise, first, the complex multi-stage mechanism of development of ideologies to the level of the present, and second, the multimodal and diverse nature of individual ideologies. Thirdly, ideology and ideological activity have the ability to expand the zone of their own influence on people, society, and states as they develop through certain tools and mechanisms. Fourthly, by analysing the modern history and trends in the development of ideologies, we can identify the importance of nation-state ideologies in rationalising wars in the world today. This topic has great prospects for further research through the use of both contemporary and historical examples of different states. At this stage, the only thing that can be stated with a reasonable level of certainty is that the ideological activities of a state play a key role in rationalising and justifying the war it wages.

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15 Epstein, M. (2022). Schizophrenic fascism: on Russia's war in Ukraine. *Studies in East European Thought*, 74(4). P. 475-481. URL : <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11212-022-09487-w> (13.05.2023).

16 Mojzes, P. B. (2022). Blending of Delusions in Russia Rationalizing its War to Annex Ukraine. *Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe*, 42(7), 2. URL : <https://doi.org/10.55221/2693-2148.2375> (21.05.2023).